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COMPENSATING UNSECURED CREDITORS FOR
EXTRAORDINARY BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION RISKS
LYNN M. LOPUCKI AND WILLIAM C. WHITFORD*
In a series of articles, we reported the results of an empirical study of the
bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies during the
1980s.' One of our findings was that the managements of reorganizing
companies often did not pursue optimal investment policies during
reorganization. Instead, they tended to act as caretakers responsible for
preserving the company until the reorganization was concluded. They
avoided substantial asset sales when possible and rarely made substantial
acquisitions or other new investments. We referred to this practice as
"prudent investment."
In an article published last year, we advocated abandonment of the
prudent investment practice in favor of a policy of maximization of the
value of the bankruptcy estate.' We attributed management's failure to
* Lynn M. LoPucki is the William R. Orthwein Professor of Law at Washington University
School of Law in St. Louis. William C. Whitford is the Young-Bascom Professor of Business Law at
the University of Wisconsin Law School. The authors' names are in alphabetical order. The order does
not indicate relative contribution to the project or this article. This truly has been a joint effort.
1. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly Held Companies,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance]; Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 11 [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Venue
Choice]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorgzanization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990) [hereinafter
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share]; see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford,
Preemptive Cram Down] (advocating the extinguishing of shareholder interests in some cases of
insolvent debtors).
2. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 787 ("[W]e suggest that
attempting to maximize the value of chapter 11 estates offers the best possibility for minimizing
deadweight losses.'). See also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper
Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1993) (advocating the same position).
Under current law it may already be management's duty to maximize the value of the Chapter 11 estate,
but judicial statements on this issue are rare. E.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, inc. v. Rural
Electrification Admin., 903 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A debtor [in possession] in bankruptcy is
supposed to maximize the value of the estate . . ").
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follow a policy of maximization to difficulties presented by the conflicting
interests of creditors and shareholders.3 To reduce creditors' and
shareholders' incentives to resist managers' efforts to maximize, we
proposed that parties to the reorganization case who stand to benefit during
the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization from a particular investment
be required to compensate those disadvantaged by it.4 The purpose of this
article is to elaborate on that proposal.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CREDITORS AND SHAREHOLDERS OVER
INVESTMENT POLICY
Finance theory has long recognized the potential for conflict between
creditors and shareholders over the investment policy of the firm.5 Fama
and Miller employ an illustration6 in which a firm in period 1 has
promised payment of 5 to its bondholders in period 2. The firm must
choose between zero-risk production plan a, which will assure that the firm
has a value of 7 in period 2, and high-risk production plan b, which creates
equally likely possibilities that the firm will have a value of 1 or 10 in
period 2. Plan a is in the interests of the bondholders; its adoption will
insure their payment in full. Plan b offers bondholders no possibility of
more than full payment and threatens them with the possibility of less.
Under one possible state in period 2, the firm will have value of only 1 and
therefore be unable to pay the 5 it owes bondholders. Plan b is in the
interests of the shareholders; its adoption gives the shareholders a 50%
probability that there will be no value for them in period 2 and a 50%
probability that a value of 5 will be available to them in period 2. The
expectancy value of the shareholders' recoveries is 2.5, higher than the
value of 2 they would receive under plan a. The following table is
reproduced from Fama and Miller's book:7
3. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 782-85.
4. Id. at 788-92.
5. See, e.g., EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 178-81 (1972).
6. Id. at 179-80.
7. Id. at 180. In Table 1, V(l) is the value of the company at period 1, B(1) is the value of the
bonds at period 1, and S(I) is the value of the shares at period 1.
[VOL. 72:1133
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TABLE 1
Payoff at Period 2 Market Values at Period 1
Production Plan State 1 State 2 V(1) B(l) S(1)
a 7 7 7 5 2
b 1 10 5.5 3 2.5
NOTE: p(l) = p(2) = 0.5. Promised payment on debt is 5 at period 2.
In Fama and Miller's illustration, plan a is in the interests of the
bondholders, and it also maximizes the present value of the firm. But
Fama and Miller presumed that the shareholders would control investment
policy and that the company would pursue plan b.
Fama and Miller considered their observation of little practical impor-
tance for two reasons. First, they did not think such situations often
arose.' Second, when such situations did arise, they thought the parties
could solve the problem by agreement. That is, the party that stands to
benefit from an optimal investment policy could pay the party in control to
pursue that policy. For example, if the bondholders in the Fama and Miller
illustration offer shareholders more than 0.5 of the bondholders' recovery
to pursue plan a, it then will be in the interests of bondholders, sharehold-
ers, and the firm to pursue it.9 In the words of Fama and Miller:
[T]here may be some way, and indeed there may be many ways, that side
payments between the bondholders and shareholders can be arranged so that
with the operating decision that maximizes [firm value] every security
holder's wealth is at least as great as it would be with any other operating
decision."
For this reason, Fama and Miller did not develop further the implications
of the conflict they had identified.
Fama and Miller were concerned principally with solvent companies
S. FAMA & MILLER, supra note 5, at 180.
From a practical viewpoint, however, situations ofpotential conflict between bondholders and
shareholders [regarding investment policy is] probably unimportant. In general, investment
opportunities that increase a firm's market value by more than their cost both increase the
value of the firm's shares and strengthen the firm's future ability to meet its current bond
commitments.
Id.
9. Id. at 179.
10. Id.
1994] 1135
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operating in the absence of bankruptcy. Their first assumption, that the
conflict between bondholders and shareholders seldom actually arises, is not
true for insolvent companies. One of us has explained at length the variety
of conflicts between creditors and shareholders that actually arise in
insolvency and in bankruptcy." Moreover, in our study of the bankruptcy
reorganization of large, publicly held companies during the 1980s, we
found empirical evidence of creditor-shareholder conflict with regard to
investment policy during the pendency of the proceeding. 2
Fama and Miller's second assumption, that shareholders and bondholders
can realign their interests through side deals, also appears to be untrue for
companies once they enter bankruptcy reorganization. We found in our
study that such deals regarding investment policy were made only as part
of a plan of reorganization that resolved the entire case. 3 Parties such as
shareholders and bondholders did not, at least openly, reach interim deals
giving one party the investment policy it preferred on the condition that it
compensate the other parties. Because we did not empirically investigate
the reasons the parties did not make such deals, we can only speculate as
to what those reasons were. Perhaps all the parties were unable to reach
agreement. 4 But such deals might have been regarded as improper. The
managers of companies in reorganization are regarded as officers of the
court, bound to manage for the benefit of all interested parties. For the
principal parties to the case to strike an agreement that required manage-
ment to adopt a particular investment policy and also provided that one of
the principal parties would compensate another might be construed as the
payment of money for acting or forbearing to act in a bankruptcy case,
which is a criminal offense.' 5
11. Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 WXs. L. REv. 311, 333-43.
12. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 672 (examining the Continental
Airlines and Manville Corporation reorganization cases).
13. Id. at 790.
14. Bankruptcy courts, like other kinds of courts, are usually amenable to a course of action that
has been agreed to by all parties. But an agreement of the nature described here, though it might draw
no objection, would seldom be agreed to by everyone. There may be other interests whose
representatives have not joined in the agreement or there may be conflicts of interest between the
representatives who have agreed to the deal and the constituents on whose behalf they have agreed.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988) ("Whoever knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives or
attempts to obtain any money or property ... for acting or forbearing to act in any [bankruptcy] case
[.. [s~hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."). We do
not advocate that this provision be interpreted as prohibiting the kind of creditor-shareholder transfers
that Fama and Miller presupposed. So long as the transfers are not secret, they should not be regarded
[VOL. 72:1133
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II. ACCOMMODATING CREDITOR-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT THROUGH
PRUDENT INVESTMENT
In this Part we describe why, under current practice, investment policy
during a reorganization proceeding tends to follow the pattern we describe
as prudent investment. The bankruptcy reorganization system formally
provides for investment policy through a grant to management of ostensibly
broad discretion. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy reorganization case, the
debtor becomes debtor in possession and its management continues in
office. The debtor in possession is generally authorized to continue to
operate the business in the ordinary course. 16 For transactions outside the
ordinary course of business, management must obtain court approval after
notice and a hearing. 7 In granting approval, the courts extend deference
to the expertise of management in a manner similar to that extended by
state courts to management under the business judgment rule.'8 The
managers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, its creditors, and its
shareholders, but in bankruptcy there has been almost no litigation
concerning how these duties affect investment policy.'9 There is little
evidence that concerns about fiduciary obligations have had any practical
impact on investment policy in bankruptcy.
To understand why a formal grant of discretion to management results
in a prudent investment norm, one must first understand how a
management's attempt to effect even a small increase in firm value can
result in a dramatically large shift in the entitlements of creditors and
shareholders. Assume that the debtor owes unsecured creditors $100
million and that its sole asset is a chain of restaurants with an estimated
liquidation value of $100 million. Management is considering an
investment plan under which it would borrow $100 million secured by the
restaurants and invest it in a new restaurant format; that is, the money
would be spent in giving the restaurants a new image and appearance. If
the new format is successful, management believes that the value of the
company will be $240 million over and above what will then be owing to
secured creditors; if the new format fails, management believes the
as "fraudulent." Indeed, we advocate in this article a procedure to encourage and in some cases
mandate such transfers.
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108, 363(c)(1) (1988).
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), 364(b) (1988).
IS. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note I, at 705.
19. See id. at 706-10.
113719941
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restaurants will have no value over and above what is owing to secured
creditors-the secured creditors will repossess everything. Management
considers the two outcomes equally likely. Further assume that the market
values of the expectancies thus generated are as shown in this table:2"
TABLE 2
VALUE OF EXPECTANCIES FOR FIRM
Value of
Level Total expectancies Market
of return before risk value
risk discount
Liquidate 0% $100 million $100 million $100 million
Reopen 50% $240 million or $0 $120 million' $105 millionb
a. This number is simply a weighted average of the possible results indicated in the previous
column. Since each outcome has a 50% probability, the expectancy is the average of the two.
b. We have assumed a risk discount rate of 12.5%. This assumption is arbitrary and is not based
on actual market discount rates or estimates thereof.
To maximize the value of this company, management should pursue the
high-risk investment policy. Yet the risk of pursuing that policy would be
borne entirely by the unsecured creditors. As soon as the debtor committed
to that course of action, the value of the unsecured creditors' expectancy
would fall to less than half of what the unsecured creditors would have
received in liquidation:
TABLE 3
VALUE OF EXPECTANCIES FOR CREDITORS
Value of
creditors' Market
Level Creditors' expectancy value of
of return before risk creditors'
risk discount expectancy
Liquidate 0% $100 million $100 million $100 million
Reopen 50% $100 million or $0 $50 million $43.75 million
20. Tables 2, 3, and 4, including the associated footnotes, are reproduced from LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 783-84.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/26
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The new course would benefit shareholders even more than it would injure
creditors:
TABLE 4
VALUE OF EXPECTANCIES FOR SHAREHOLDERS
Value of
shareholders' Market
Level Shareholders' expectancy value of
of return before risk shareholders'
risk discount expectancy
Liquidate 0% $0 $0 $0
Reopen 50% $140 million' or $0 $70 million $61.25 million
a. This figure assumes that the reopening was successful and that the restaurant chain increased
in value to $240 million. Ifa reorganization plan was then confirmed and securities having this value
were distributed, the first $100 million in securities would be distributed to creditors under the absolute
priority rule, leaving securities worth $140 million for shareholders.
Were management truly independent of the creditors and shareholders,
the potential for their investment decisions to redistribute wealth between
creditors and shareholders would not be troublesome. In fact, however,
reorganization management is independent only in a formal sense. As we
have described in greater detail elsewhere, the system of corporate
governance during bankruptcy reorganization is an elaborate game of
capture.2' In this game, management is a semi-autonomous player whose
leverage derives from its powers of initiative with regard to transactions
during the pendency of the reorganization and to a reorganization plan, its
influence over the timing of the reorganization case, its superior access to
information, and other factors.
Contrary to the assumptions underlying most models of corporate
governance during reorganization,22 shareholder democracy largely ceases
to function during bankruptcy reorganization. We found that if the
company was insolvent, shareholders had little ability to discipline
21. Id. at 692-720.
22. A catalog of models employing unrealistic assumptions about the relationship between
shareholders and management during bankruptcy appears in LoPucki and Whitford, Corporate
Governance, supra note 1, at 673 n.8.
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management by threatening to vote them out of office.23 The bankruptcy
courts were likely to enjoin the vote. If the company was solvent, the
courts were more likely to permit shareholders to vote, but even then were
not certain to do so. Creditors had similarly little ability to remove
managers from office through formally recognized legal means. Creditors
do not vote on the continuation of management in office. While creditors
can move for the appointment of a trustee, such motions are rarely made
or granted.24
We found, however, that both creditors and shareholders had consider-
ably greater power to remove or discipline managers informally. For
example, creditors often had the ability to extend or withhold needed
credit.25 Creditors and shareholders could generate leverage against
management by objecting to or threatening to object to actions management
wished to pursue. Groups of creditors or shareholders could also gain
leverage over management by participating in the fixing of management
employment contract incentives.
In practice, this combination of leverages tended to produce behavior
reflecting a policy of prudent investment-a convenient compromise of
competing interests. Management's reluctance to take new initiatives
protects creditors from the risk of large additional losses. At the same
time, continuation of the existing businesses preserves the jobs of
management and offers junior interests some hope that changing market
conditions will cause a sufficient increase in the value of those assets that
the reorganization plan can provide for a distribution to them. But the
failure of the practice of prudent investment is that it is not calculated to
maximize the value of the firm's assets. If it does so, it is sheer coinci-
dence.
III. RESOLVING CREDITOR-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT THROUGH
COLLAPSED RESIDUAL OWNERSHIP
In an article published in 1988,26 Professors Douglas G. Baird and
Thomas H. Jackson proposed to resolve the creditor-shareholder conflict by
vesting the power to govern the reorganizing company in the "residual
claimants." As they put it:
23. See id. at 696-98.
24. See id. at 699-700.
25. See id. at 701-04.
26. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CH[. L. Rv. 738 (1988).
[VOL. 72:1133
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The Bankruptcy Code pays too little attention to ensuring that the residual
claimants are in control of the firm.... [T]he law of corporate reorganiza-
tions should focus on identifying the residual owner, limiting agency
problems in representing the residual owner, and making sure that the
residual owner has control over the negotiations that the firm must make
while it is restructuring.27
Baird and Jackson recognized that a reorganizing firm might have a range
of possible future values, making it difficult to identify the residual owners
who "should always be the ones who enjoy the benefits of making good
decisions and incur the costs of making bad ones. '2' That is, depending
on how various risks played out in the future of the business, a company
might be either solvent or insolvent. Baird and Jackson proposed to
resolve the difficulty by "collapsing" the future possibilities of various
values to a single present value, in much the same way that a purchaser of
the company would when deciding how much to pay.29 That is, the
present value of the company is the average of the possible future
outcomes, each weighted by the likelihood it will occur. They justified this
approach on the basis that the reorganizing company is in default; to
collapse all future possible values into a single current "price" is to give the
creditors only what they are entitled to under their contracts.3"
We criticized Baird and Jackson's collapsed residual ownership proposal
because, in the context of a reorganization case, it would not accomplish
its purpose of putting control in the hands of those who stood to gain or
lose by the investment decision. Rather than eliminating the conflict,
granting control to the collapsed residual owner would merely enable the
collapsed residual owner to resolve the conflict in its own favor. In some
cases, the collapsed residual owner would accomplish this by pursuing a
suboptimal investment policy. To illustrate our point, assume that the
company hypothesized by Fama and Miller is in bankruptcy reorganization
during period 1. Although the decision the company is about to make may
render it insolvent, the shareholders are currently the collapsed residual
owners.3 They presumably would choose production plan b because it
27. Id. at 765, 775.
28. Id. at 787-88.
29. Id. at 755.
30. Id. at 762.
31. The firm owes 5 to creditors, which is less than its present value in period 1 regardless of
which investment plan it chooses.
19941 1141
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would maximize the value of their interest 2 even though that plan does
not maximize the value of the company.33 Thus, on the facts of Fama and
Miller's example, collapsed residual ownership would lead to adoption of
the wrong plan.
For collapsed residual ownership to work, the collapsing cannot be
merely theoretical, it must be real. Once the reorganization system
determines the identity of the collapsed residual owners and gives them
decisionmaking authority, it must insure that those owners bear the entire
risk and reap the entire gain from the decisions they make. To insure that
the residual owners and decisionmakers bear the entire risk, the reorganiza-
tion system must immediately extinguish claims and interests junior to
those of the collapsed residual owners, and assure absolutely the payment
of claims senior to those of the collapsed residual owners.
Normally, extinction of junior claims and interests, and assurance of
payment of senior claims, happens through the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization at the conclusion of the bankruptcy case. That is, unless the
class of which they are a member consents to lesser treatment, senior
claimants will either be left "unimpaired," meaning that the senior
claimants receive full "legal, equitable, and contractual rights,"'34 or a plan
will be crammed down against them.35 In a cram down, senior claimants
will be entitled to property that has a present value equal to the full amount
of their claim.36 Therefore, unless a class senior to the residual class
waives their rights, they must be assured payment in full. Unless the class
deemed to be the residual owner at the time of confirmation waives its
rights, all claims and interests junior to that class must be extinguished
without compensation.37 Indeed, a principal purpose of reorganization is
to extinguish underwater claims and interests.
The hope that this restructuring can be accomplished at the beginning of
the reorganization case to provide a means of determining who should
control the company during reorganization is unrealistic. As the system
currently operates, such restructuring is the subject of extensive negotiation
and/or litigation. Once terms for the restructuring are determined and
32. The shareholders would receive 2.5 under plan b, but only 2 under plan a. See supra notes
6-7 and accompanying text.
33. The value of the company would be 7 under production plan a, but only 5.5 under production
plan b.
34. I1 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
35. 11 U.S.C. § I 129(a)(8) (1988).
36. See II U.S.C. § I 129(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1988).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), (C)(ii) (1988).
[VOL. 72:1133
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/26
COMPENSATING UNSECURED CREDITORS
formalized in a confirmed plan, the case is over. Suppose that under some
other procedure it was possible to determine the terms for restructuring
more quickly.38 There would be no reason not to use those terms to
resolve the entire reorganization case. Bankruptcy reorganization would be
a shorter process. While the problem of conflict between creditors and
shareholders over investment policy would persist during the pendency of
the shorter cases, it would be a less serious problem because it would
distort the company's investment policy over a shorter period of time.
We stress that the problem of conflict between creditors and shareholders
over investment policy during bankruptcy reorganization cannot be resolved
until there is resolution of the entire case. An attempt to identify a residual
class of claimants early in the proceeding and to put them in charge will
only substitute one set of distorted investment incentives for another. That
will happen because the value of the company could change over the
course of the reorganization, and with it, the values of the interests of both
the residual and the nonresidual claimants. The class in charge will have
incentives to favor investment policy likely to increase their own share, not
the value of the company. Thus, if the class in charge is a senior class,
they will bear all the loss when company value declines but only some of
the benefit when company value increases. If increases were great enough,
they would be shared with junior classes who would then be "in the
money." Hence, this senior class would continue to have an incentive to
favor risk-averse investment policies. On the other hand, if the class
deemed to be the "collapsed residual owner" was a junior class just barely
in the money, it might bear only a small part of the cost of declines in
value while reaping all or most of the benefit of increases in value. Hence,
it would have incentives to favor risky investments.
In the next Part, we describe our proposal for moderating the harm
resulting from the current conflict over investment policy. The essence of
our proposal is to moderate the incentives for holders of senior and junior
interests to compete for control of the company's investment policy.
Without the pressures generated by this competition, managers could be
given greater freedom to pursue the investment policy that would in their
opinion maximize the value of the estate.
38, We have proposed the entry of preemptive cram down orders that would eliminate some junior
claims and interests when that can be done without the need to resolve close issues of valuation. See
LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 1. Our purpose is to simplify the
negotiations leading to the ultimate plan of reorganization, but there is a great difference between
extinguishing some clearly underwater claims and interests and resolving the entire reorganization case.
1994] 1143
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IV. OUR SOLUTION: SPEEDIER REORGANIZATIONS, OPTIMAL
INVESTMENT, AND RISK COMPENSATION PAYMENTS
The solution we propose to the creditor-shareholder conflict over
investment policy is in two parts. The first is to minimize the length of
time debtor companies remain in reorganization. As we stated above, the
less time a company is in reorganization, the less opportunity there is for
the conflict over investment policies to cause serious loss in company
value. One of us has elaborated on this point elsewhere.39
The second part of the solution we propose is more novel. First, we
would have the Code explicitly mandate that the management of a Chapter
11 debtor adopt the investment policy that maximizes company value,
regardless of its distributional effects. While many believe this to be the
guiding rule already, it is not explicitly stated in the Code, and as we have
observed, it is not the prevailing practice.
Second, we would require that the parties whose claims or interests gain
value compensate the parties whose claims or interests lose value as a
consequence of management's decision to vary the company's investment
risk from what we have called a prudent investment strategy. The
compensation we propose, which we call risk compensation payments,
would not be paid in cash, but in whatever kinds of securities or rights that
the parties benefitting from the investment decision have in the debtor
corporation. To illustrate, consider again the case of the borderline-solvent
restaurant chain that could either liquidate or gamble all of its resources on
a new restaurant format. Once management decides that the expectancies
generated by taking the gamble have a higher market value than the
expectancies generated by liquidation or any other business strategy,
management must take the gamble. The shareholders become obligated to
make payments to the creditors to compensate for the extraordinary risks
thereby imposed on the creditors. The payments would be in shares.
To determine the amount of compensation that shareholders must pay,
one must first determine what creditors have "lost." After all, management
has only acted to maximize firm value. One could argue that creditors
assumed that risk when they extended credit. Based on our study, we
argue to the contrary. Under current practice, the creditors should have
expected, and if they thought about it probably did expect, that in the event
of reorganization the company would follow a prudent investment strategy.
39. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729.
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Returning to our previous example, the restaurant chain would continue
operations using the current restaurant format until a plan was confirmed.
At that time the new owners could be expected to adopt the optimal
investment policy-reformatting the restaurant-if that remains the most
advantageous course.
The first task in fixing the amount of risk compensation payments would
be to estimate a present value for the company at the time the investment
decision is made on the assumption that the company will maintain a
prudent investment strategy throughout the period of reorganization.
Assume in the restaurant example that this value is $95 million. As shown
in Table 4, immediate pursuit of the optimal investment policy would give
the interests of shareholders, which would have had little or no value under
a policy of prudent investment," a value of $61.25 million. Pursuit of the
optimal investment policy would reduce the present value of the unsecured
creditors' claims from approximately $95 million41 to $43.75 million.42
Under our proposal, the shareholders would be obligated to compensate the
creditors for this difference of $51.25 million. Shareholders would make
the payment by transferring shares of this value, which in this example
would constitute 84% of their shares.43
After making the risk compensation payment, shareholders, who would
have recovered little or nothing under the current practice of prudent
investment, will have shares with a present value of about $10 million.
Creditors, whose claims would have had a present value of approximately
$95 million under a prudent investment policy, will now have claims with
a present value of $43.75 million and shares with a present value of $51.25
million, for a total present value of $95 million. By the end of the
40. Since creditors are owed $100 million in the hypothetical, if the prudent investment policy is
followed and no changes are made in the company's operations, shareholders likely would receive
nothing upon reorganization. There is always some upside potential, however, no matter what
investment policy is followed-restaurant business may increase, for example, because competing
businesses choose to liquidate, or consumers start eating out in greater numbers. Hence, even at the
time the investment decision is made, it is possible the shares would have some positive value.
41. We assume that the present value of creditors' claims will approximate the present value of
the company in a case where the latter value is less than the total amount of creditors' claims. The
value of the company at liquidation could go up or down, of course, and since creditors bear all the
downside risk but receive only some of the benefit of any increase in value, the actual present value
of creditors' claims under an assumption that the company would continue a prudent investment policy
could be a little less than the value of the company.
42. See supra table 3.
43. Their shares are worth $61.25 million and they owe a payment of $51.25 million, so they
would have to transfer 51.25/61.25, or 84% of their shares.
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reorganization case, the values of these holdings will be different. If the
restaurant reformatting strategy proves unsuccessful, the holdings of both
creditors and shareholders will be worth nothing. However, if the
reformatting proves successful, a 50% probability in our example, those
holdings will be worth $240 million. Creditors will receive full payment
of their $100 million in claims. The 84% ownership interest they received
as risk compensation will add $117.6 million to their recovery.44 The
shareholders' 16% interest in the company will be worth $22.4 million.
Our purpose in requiring shareholders to compensate creditors for the
risk imposed on the creditors by reopening the restaurants is to reduce the
incentives for creditors to attempt to capture control of management and
use that control to move the company toward an investment policy that is
in their interests, but not in the interests of the company as a whole.
Without risk compensation payments, creditors could gain $56.25 million
by forcing an immediate liquidation; under our proposal, creditors could
gain only $5 million by forcing liquidation. By practically eliminating the
creditors' incentives to resist the optimal investment, we hope to free
management to make it.
In determining the amount of risk compensation payments, we assume
that a prudent investment strategy, essentially preservation of the status
quo, is the best prediction of what would happen in the absence of the
payments we propose. For this reason, prudent investment is the most
appropriate baseline for measuring what creditors have "lost" through
adoption of the optimal investment strategy.
Another way of understanding our proposal is to view a prudent
investment strategy during the pendency of a reorganization as part of the
creditors' contractual expectation when they extend credits, because it is
such a common course of action. Risk compensation payments are
compensation for suspension of this expectation. They can be analogized
to adequate protection payments for secured creditors. The purpose of both
types of payments is to protect creditors against deterioration in the value
of their claims during the period of the automatic stay.45 Both are
44. That is, 84% of $140 million which equals $117.6 million.
45. In one important respect, the two types of payments are different. The courts do not order
adequate protection payments to compensate for risks imposed on secured creditors. If the debtor can
insure against the risk, the court will order that the debtor do so. See, e.g., Carteret Savings Bank, F.A.
v. Nastasi-White, Inc. (In re East-West Assoc.), 106 B.R. 767, 773 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring
that the debtor pay the creditor's insurance cost as part of adequate protection). If the debtor cannot
insure against the risk, the court determines whether the risk is "significant." If it is, the debtor cannot
impose the risk on the secured creditor. If the risk is not significant, no protection is ordered and the
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reflections of the same basic principle of equity: when one party's rights
are commandeered for the benefit of the group, the group should compen-
sate that party.46
Our rationale for proposing risk compensation payments is equally
applicable to the common situation where a low-risk liquidation is the
optimal investment policy, but the prudent investment strategy implies
continuation of the business to explore the possibility that it can recover
from its problems. Here too, we advocate requiring management to pursue
the optimal policy, and requiring the creditors to compensate the sharehold-
ers for eliminating the possibility of a rehabilitation that under current
practice causes their shares to have market value. We see a possibility,
however, that shareholders will be doubly compensated if they receive risk
compensation payments early in the case and, ultimately, the distributions
under the plan of reorganization deviate from the absolute priority rule in
their favor. We have described elsewhere the constellation of factors that
bring about deviations from the absolute priority rule.47 The closing and
liquidation of the business is likely to reduce the size of the deviation from
the absolute priority rule, but neither that, nor a court order that the risk
compensation payment is in lieu of any deviation, is likely to eliminate all
causes of the deviation or the deviation itself. Instead, we suggest that the
court set the risk compensation payment at an amount that, coupled with
the value of shares resulting from the likely subsequent deviation from
absolute priority, equals the value the shares would have had if the
company had followed a prudent investment strategy.
The creditor-shareholder dichotomy that we have employed throughout
this paper is, in at least one important respect, an oversimplification of the
problem with which we deal. In a large publicly held company, there are
likely to be claims, and perhaps even shares, having several levels of
priority.48 A conflict, similar in nature to the conflict between creditors
secured creditor is compelled to bear the risk. To facilitate reorganization, the courts often determine
that substantial risks are "insignificant." See, e.g., In re O'Connor, 808 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the risk that three gas wells to be drilled would be dry holes was insignificant); In re
Berens, 41 B.R. 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (finding a lien on crops to be planted and insured against
hail damage to be adequate protection).
46. The bankruptcy courts have assumed, virtually without discussion, that unsecured creditors are
not entitled to adequate protection. See, e.g., In re Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., 114 B.R. 45,
48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[T]he concepts of adequate protection of an interest in property and the
existence of an equity interest in property do not apply to unsecured claims.").
47. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 1, at 143-58.
48. In our study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies, we
documented the frequency with which these multiple levels occurred. See LoPucki & Whitford,
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and shareholders described in Part I of this paper, exists at each of the
boundaries between levels of priority. However, we see no reason why the
solution we have proposed for the two-party conflict is any less applicable
to cases involving multi-party conflicts. The optimal investment policy
should always produce value greater than would have been available under
a policy of prudent investment. Those who benefit from the change in
policy will still be better off even after they compensate those who suffered
from the change.49
The determination of the appropriate amounts of risk compensation
payments cannot be a precise science. We contemplate that the question
of whether the court should require risk compensation payments in the
particular case could be raised by motion of any interested party, including
management at the time it proposes a particular investment strategy.50
Judgment, and perhaps even some guesswork, will then be needed to
determine the present values of claims and interests under a prudent
investment policy and their present values under an optimal investment
policy.5' The process we contemplate for determining the amounts would
be quick and dirty, much like the process currently employed for determin-
ing the amounts of adequate protection payments for secured creditors."
The principal purpose of requiring risk compensation payments is to blunt
incentives which drive creditors and shareholders to attempt to capture
management and subvert investment policy to the less than optimal. Risk
compensation payments in even a rough approximation of the appropriate
amount should be sufficient to accomplish that purpose.
Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 775 n.337.
49. An illustration of risk compensation in a multi-level priority situation appears in LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 791-94.
50. Management normally must obtain court approval before implementing an investment strategy
that requires a significant change in the use of the company's assets. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
51. To the extent there are, or will be, markets for claims and interests in these companies, the
amounts for which the claims and interests are bought and sold may be useful evidence of the present
values under an optimal investment policy.
52. To determine the appropriate amount of adequate protection payments, the courts must
determine the amount of the decline that will occur in the value of the collateral during the time the stay
is in effect. See United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
382 (1988) (holding that an "undersecured petitioner is not entitled to interest on its collateral during
the stay to assure adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)"); In re Bonner Mall Partnership,
147 B.R. 50 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992) (determining on motion whether a $3.2 million shopping mall was
declining in value).
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An award of risk compensation payments would not violate any
provision of current bankruptcy law. It might be justified as an exercise
of the court's power to "issue any order ... that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title." 3 Nonetheless, enabling legisla-
tion is desirable. A change from a practice of prudent investment to a
practice of optimal investment combined with risk compensation payments
is an important change in system philosophy. As the system currently
operates, managements are unlikely to propose extreme-risk alternatives to
prudent investment policy. Proposing such alternatives invites criticism by
other parties in the case, and the courts are unlikely to approve them
because of their extreme distributional consequences to creditors and
shareholders. Courts that may be inclined to approve extreme-risk
alternatives if those advantaged by them compensate those disadvantaged
may have doubts about the legality of the necessary payments. The result
is that implementation of the optimal solution to the debtor's problem is
delayed until after confirmation. Legislation authorizing risk compensation
payments could provide the necessary catalyst to change that practice.
V. SUMMARY
There has been much lamenting about unnecessary costs of bankruptcy
reorganization. Research has shown that many of the supposed costs of
reorganization are not nearly as great as once supposed.54 In our judg-
ment, one major source of inefficiency in Chapter 11 has been the
investment policies normally adopted by companies during the pendency
of a reorganization proceeding. These investment policies have emphasized
maintenance of the status quo, avoiding quick liquidation of assets but also
avoiding investments in acquisitions or new business strategies. We call
this typical investment policy during reorganization a prudent investment
strategy.
It is reasonable to assume that a prudent investment policy often is not
a maximizing investment strategy for the firm. Yet it is adopted because
it reflects a reasonable compromise among the competing interests of
different classes of claims and interests. Senior classes will tend to favor
conservative, liquidating strategies, since those classes bear all or most of
the risk of losses from riskier investment strategies, yet will reap little or
53. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
54. See William C. Whitford, WJhat's Right About Chapter I1, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1381-85
(1994).
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none of benefits if a risk-taking strategy proves profitable. On the other
hand, junior classes will tend to favor risk-taking strategies, since they will
reap all or most of the benefits and bear little or none of the risks.
Whether as an accommodation among the parties themselves, a manage-
ment dynamic, or a compromise imposed by the courts, the prevailing
response to this conflict has been the policy of prudent investment.
Prudent investment is, however, often a suboptimal strategy. The loss to
firm value from its pursuit can be substantial, particularly given the often
extensive period companies spend in Chapter 11.
Commentators who have addressed this problem before us have
recommended that control over investment policy during a reorganization
be assigned to the "residual owner." But determining who is the residual
class of claims or interests at the beginning of the case and putting them
in control does not in itself terminate the claims and interests of junior
classes. Some or all of those junior classes may nevertheless be "in the
money" if the firm is successful during the reorganization. Because those
classes continue to own some of the possible benefits from risk taking, the
incentives of the residual owners to take risks remain less than optimal
until the end of the case. It will not be in the interests of the residual
owners to take all risks necessary to maximize the value of the estate.
While by definition the residual class of claims or interests bears some of
both the upside and the downside risk of future investments, it would only
be by coincidence that these risks would be equally balanced. Almost
inevitably, the residual class will have more of either the upside or the
downside risk, and hence have incentives to favor investment strategies that
are either more risk prone or more risk averse than maximization principles
imply.
Our suggested solution to the problem of prudent investment policy is to
mandate that management adopt maximizing investment strategies and
provide for "risk compensation payments" to any class of claims or
interests disadvantaged by adoption of a maximizing strategy, as compared
to current normal practice of a prudent investment strategy. The payments
would be made by the classes benefitting from adoption of the maximizing
strategy. They would not be cash payments, but rather would take the form
of transfer of some of the claims or shares from the benefitting classes to
the disadvantaged classes. The purpose of risk compensation payments is
55. In our study of 43 reorganizations involving large, publicly held companies, the average
duration of the proceeding exceeded two years. See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note
I, at 31 n.68.
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to reduce the incentives of disadvantaged classes to resist the adoption of
maximizing strategies by enhancing the benefits they receive from adoption
of that investment strategy. In that sense this proposal can be seen as a
very practical one, designed to counteract the norms or system dynamics
that so often cause management to follow a prudent investment strategy.
From a normative perspective, risk compensation payments can be seen as
similar to adequate protection payments to secured creditors. Both
payments reflect the policy that if bankruptcy is to interfere with normal
contractual expectations of some classes for the collective good of all
claimants in the proceeding, then compensation should be made. Here,
normal contractual expectations with respect to investment policy during
the proceeding are assumed to be reflected in the prudent investment
strategy.
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